[War_ooc] Food for thought

[pentaj2 at Scranton.edu]

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/003384.html:
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It’s the kind of thing that might be more appropriate to post on, say, 
a Sunday so you can read it with a mug of coffee and some time to 
think. But I didn’t want this one to grow stale.

Though it’s a subscriber site, DT has a line on a few analytical 
pieces from the private intelligence firm, Stratfor. They can be a bit 
in the weeds at times, but this one is a big chunk of food for thought 
as it attempts to answer the fundamental question of why the United 
States seems to get itself in conflicts that end in stalemate.

The muddled result of the war in Iraq may not have been such a 
surprise after all, and, in some twisted way, may serve America’s 
overall purpose in the global war on terrorism – though 
unintentionally – Stratfor says.

Excerpts of the intel analysis follow:

…In considering the situation, our attention is drawn to a strange 
paradox that has been manifest in American foreign policy since World 
War II. On the one hand, the United States has consistently 
encountered strategic stalemate or defeat in particular politico-
military operations. At those times, the outcomes have appeared to be 
disappointing if not catastrophic. Yet, over the same period of time, 
U.S. global power, on the whole, has surged. In spite of stalemate and 
defeat during the Cold War, the United States was more in 2000 than it 
had been in 1950…


…Put somewhat differently, there is the liberal view that the Soviet 
Union was not defeated by the United States in the Cold War, but that 
it collapsed itself, and the military conflicts of the Cold War were 
unnecessary. There is the conservative view that the United States won 
the Cold War in spite of a fundamental flaw in the American character -
- an unwillingness to bear the burden of war -- and that this flaw 
ultimately will prove disastrous for the United States. Finally, there 
is the non-ideological, non-political view that the United States won 
the Cold War in spite of defeats and stalemates because these wars 
were never as important as either the liberals or conservatives made 
them out to be, however necessary they might have been seen to be at 
the time…

…If we apply these analyses to Iraq, three schools of thought emerge. 
The first says that the Iraq war is unnecessary and even harmful in 
the context of the U.S.-jihadist confrontation -- and that, regardless 
of outcome, it should not be fought. The second says that the war is 
essential -- and that, while defeat or stalemate in this conflict 
perhaps would not be catastrophic to the United States, there is a 
possibility that it would be catastrophic. And at any rate, this 
argument continues, the United States' ongoing inability to impose its 
will in conflicts of this class ultimately will destroy it. Finally, 
there is the view that Iraq is simply a small piece of a bigger war 
and that the outcome of this particular conflict will not be decisive, 
although the war might be necessary. The heated rhetoric surrounding 
the Iraq conflict stems from the traditional American inability to 
hold things in perspective…

…Even in cases where the enemy was engaged fully, the United States 
limited its commitment of resources. In Vietnam, for example, the 
defeat of North Vietnam and regime change were explicitly ruled out. 
The United States had as its explicit goal a stalemate, in which both 
South and North Vietnam survived as independent states. In Korea, the 
United States shifted to a stalemate strategy after the Chinese 
intervention. So too in Cuba after the Cuban missile crisis; and in 
Iran, the United States accepted defeat in an apparently critical 
arena without attempting a major intervention. In each instance, the 
mark of U.S. intervention was limited exposure -- even at the cost of 
stalemate or defeat…

…In other words, the United States consistently has entered into 
conflicts in which its level of commitment was extremely limited, in 
which either victory was not the strategic goal or the mission 
eventually was redefined to accept stalemate, and in which even defeat 
was deemed preferable to a level of effort that might avert it. Public 
discussion on all sides was apoplectic both during these conflicts and 
afterward, yet American global power was not materially affected in 
the long run...

…This appears to make no sense until we introduce a military concept 
into the analysis: the spoiling attack. The spoiling attack is an 
offensive operation; however, its goal is not to defeat the enemy but 
to disrupt enemy offensives -- to, in effect, prevent a defeat by the 
enemy. The success of the spoiling attack is not measured in term of 
enemy capitulation, but the degree to which it has forestalled 
successful enemy operations…

…The invasion four years ago has led to the Sunnis and Shia turning 
against each other in direct conflict. Therefore, it could be argued 
that just as the United States won the Cold War by exploiting the Sino-
Soviet split and allying with Mao Zedong, so too the path to defeating 
the jihadists is not a main attack, but a spoiling attack that turns 
Sunnis and Shia against each other. This was certainly not the intent 
of the Bush administration in planning the 2003 invasion; it has 
become, nevertheless, an unintended and significant outcome…

…Moreover, it is far from clear whether U.S. policymakers through 
history have been aware of this dimension in their operations. In 
considering Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, it is never clear that the 
Truman, Kennedy, Johnson/Nixon or Carter/Reagan administrations 
purposely set out to implement a spoiling attack. The fog of political 
rhetoric and the bureaucratized nature of the U.S. foreign policy 
apparatus make it difficult to speak of U.S. "strategy" as such. Every 
deputy assistant secretary of something-or-other confuses his little 
piece of things with the whole, and the American culture demonizes and 
deifies without clarifying…

…However, there is a deep structure in U.S. foreign policy that 
becomes visible. The incongruities of stalemate and defeat on the one 
side and growing U.S. power on the other must be reconciled. The 
liberal and conservative arguments explain things only partially. But 
the idea that the United States rarely fights to win can be explained. 
It is not because of a lack of moral fiber, as conservatives would 
argue; nor a random and needless belligerence, as liberals would 
argue. Rather, it is the application of the principle of spoiling 
operations -- using limited resources not in order to defeat the enemy 
but to disrupt and confuse enemy operations…

I know it’s heavy reading for a Monday morning, but it’s worth 
considering as the Iraq war grinds on without any clear momentum 
toward “victory” or even “success.”
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I dislike debating Iraq; I agree with anybody else it is more or less 
a screwup. But the idea - that maybe we don't need to win, just shake 
things up - seems plausible.